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The Delta three-stage vehicle that launched the OSO-C spacscraft horn 
complex 17, Pad E, at  Cape Kennedy, Florida on August 25, 1965, experienced a 
flight failure. A review of vehicle T/M data indicated nominal performance of 
the first and second stages up to 0.61 seconds after spin-up of the third stage. 
At this time the third stage chamber pressure rose indicating premature igni- 
tion of the third stage motor. Simultane~usly, severe second stage attitude dis- 
turbances were experienced accompanied by second stage T/M dropout. Sepa- 
ration of the third stage from the second stage was probably effected by burning 
through the spin table. 
Investigation of the possible causes for the premature ignition established 
that malfunction of the six second time delay squib used to ignite the third stage 
motor was the most probable cause of the failure. Tests conducted on this type 
of squib during the failure investigation revealed that the most probable mode of 
failure was blow-by of the hot g;*ses from the ignition charge passed the six (6) 
second time delay train and igniting the ma.in output charge of the squib. 
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DELTA VEHICLE FLIGHT FAILURE REPORT 
LAUNCH 33 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the Delta 33 launch vehicle was to inject the OSO-C space- 
craft into a 300 nautical mile circular orbit with an inclination of 33 degrees. 
The DSV-3C three-stage vehicle used to launch OSO-C was composed of a MB-3 
Block II f i rs t  stage, and Aerojet General Corporation AJ10-118A second stage, 
and an ABL X-258-C third stage motor. A mission peculiar telemetry system 
was incorporated on the third stage to obtain performance data on the X-258 
motor. (See Appendix A for a description of the third stage telemetry system 
and third stage flight performance). 
Vehicle flight data indicates nominal performance and sequencing of the 
first  and second stages up until 0.61 seconds after second stage programmer 
Sequence #4. Table 1 shows the predicted and bctual sequence of events. Se- 
quence #4 fires the eight spin rockets on the spin table, initiates the third stage 
time delay (6 seconds) squibs, starts the mechanical payload timer that effects 
third stage/spacecraft separation, ignites a one second pyrotechnic timer that 
f i res  second to third stage wire cutters, and fires a four-second pyrotechnic 
timer for Sequence #5 back-up. Two seconds la'ter Sequence #5 effects second/ 
third stage separation by firing two explosive bolts on the marmon band holding 
the stages together and retros the second stage back from the released third 
stage. 
Second stage spin table monitoring switch T/M data shows that approxi- 
mately one revolution of the spacecraft/third stage assembly occurred before 
loss of the T/M signal at  third stage ignition. At spin-up a normal second stagc 
! 
roll attitude e r ro r  was experienced due to the exchange of angular momentum 1 
through the spin table bearing. Pr ior  to this time all second stage control system 3 
limit cycles and limit cycle rates were nominal. At ignition of the third stage a 
disturbance torque was imparted into both the yaw and roll axis of the second i 
stage. This disturbance is attributed to the second and third stages being still 1 
attached during ignition of the third stags. The performance of the third stage 
was approximately 18 percent low a s  indicated by the third stage accelerometer 
c' a. Consequently, insufficient velocity was obtained and the payload did not i 
achieve orbit. 
f 
The conclusion reached from the second and third stage data is that. the 
third stage motor (X-258) ignited prematurely before the second stage signal to 
Table 1 
SEQUENCE O F  LAUNCH EVENTS 
Event 
Liftoff 
MECO 
Stage II Ignition 
Sequence 1 
I Jettison Fairing 
Sequence 2 
SECO 
CTL Cutoff 
Sequence 3 
Stage Il l  spinup 
Sequence 4 
Stage I I/Stage I I I :eparation 
Sequence 5 
Sequence 5 Back-up 
Stage I l l  Ignition 
Stage I l l  Burnout 
Spacecraft/Stage I I 
Separation 
Y O  Deployment 
- -  - 
Predicted 
Time 
T + O  
T + 148.6 
MECO + 4 
MECO + 34 
MECO + 156.34 
MECO + 170.5 
MECO + 533 
MECO + 535 
MECO + 537 
MECO + 539 
MECO + 56 1.5 
MECO + 559 
MECO + 661 
- 
Ac tua I 
Time 
MECO + 4 
MECO + 34.8 
MECO + 161.1 
MECO + 170.5 
MECO + 533.0 
MECO + 534.5 
not observed 
MECO + 533.6 
MECO + 556.9 
MECO + 658.7 
MECO + 661 
initiate separation (Sequence #5) had occurred. Hence, the second stage was 
attached when ignition occurred, and the third stage burned itself free from the 
second stage. 
DISC USSlON 
The possible failure modes which could result in the premature ignition of 
the third stage motor are:  
1. Premature Motor Ignition by Means Other Than Squib 
The pyrogen igniter used in Delta 33 (shown in Figure 1) was modified after i the Delta 32 flight. This modification was made because a marginal ignition con- 1 dition between the SDGOAO squib and the BKNO, pellets, housed in the head cap 1 i
of the igniter. This condition was discovered in a test firing at  AEDC where an 
! 
attempt to ignite the X-258 motor, with one squib instead of the customary two 
squibs, failed. The investigation of this failure revealed th,?.t the squib had dis- 
charged into the pellet chamber but the BKNO, pellets failed to ignite. The 
modifications made to  the igniter tc correct this marginal ignition condition were: 
a. The use of two pellet bags in place of one. The bag material was 1 mil 
non-conducting polyethylena in lieu of the former 4 mil conducting 
polyethylene bag. 
b. Each bag contained different size pellets to improve the ignition charac- 
teristic. Pellet sizes 2A and 2L were used where only 2 L  was used in 
the past. 
c. A phenolic spacer 01 larger inside diameter was used instead of the 
styrofoam spacer to eliminate the possibility of blocking the squib port 
and also to make additional room available for the additional BKNO,. 
d. The metal screen separating the BKNO, pellets from the igniter propel- 
lant grain was redesigned and metal washers were placed under the I 
retaining screws. f i 
i 
i 
Eight pyrogen igniters were fabricated before the Delta 33 flight. Six were 1 
tested in combinations of high and low temperature, vibration, sea level and 
vacuum conditions. The two remaining igniters were scheduled for flight and 
lb 
shipped to AMR. These igniters were x-rayed and one was rejected because of 
a loose spacer between the squib port and the BKNO, pellets, the other was used f 
on Delta 33. 5 

Since the modified igniter did not undergo spin acceleraticn teets, and since 
this was the first flight of the modified igniter, the possibility existed that in the 
process of modifying the igniter it was made sensitive to spin acceleration, im- 
pact, or static electric discharge and possibly upon spin up in flight the igniter 
fired without the aid of the squib. 
The pyrogen igniter consists of several elements that operate ~cquentially. 
The main charge of the two SDGOAO squibs impinge the BKN03 pellets, which in 
turn ignite the igniter main charge. If either the BKNQ o r  the igniter 1.1ain 
charge could be set off by other than a squib firing this would be a possible 
cause for an early or premature ignition of the X-258 motor. The igniter main 
charge is sufficiently difficult to ignite that i t  is highly improbable that it could 
be ignited by other than burning of the BKNO, pellets. The p l l e t s  on the other 
hand are particularly suspect, since changes were made from the configuration 
that had been used previously. In order to increase ignition reliability, the ig- 
niter in Delta 33 u ~ e d  two doughnut shaped bags, one with 10 grams of 2L pellets 
and the other containing 7 grams of 2A pellets. In addition, the bag material was 
changed from 4 m f 1 conducting polyethylene to 1 mil non-conducting polyethylene. 
This presented two possibilities; the autoignition sensitivity of the smaller pel- 
lets and the possibility of static charge generation by the non-conducting plastic 
bags. Since spinup was occurring, the angular acceleration could have caused 
an initiating mechanism related to one of the above mentioned igniter modifica- 
tions. Therefore, test on the pyrogen igniters were condu.cted to determine the 
plausibility of these hypotheses. 
Spin tests were conducted at Allegany Ballistics Laboratory to determine 
igniter sensitivity to angular acceleration. Pyrogen igniter head caps and squibs 
of the same type used on Delta 33 were spun at angular rates much higher than 
those experienced in flight. In addition, the angular acceleration used to achieve 
these rates were much higher than those used in flight. The results of tnese 
tests, which are  outlined in detail in Appendix B resulted in no autoignition. 
In addition to the spin tests, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory conducted 
tests to determine the sensitivity of the pyrogen igniter to shock, vibration, and 
static electric discharge. The results of these tests, which are  discussed in 
detail in Reference B, show that the igniter propellant grain and +he BKKG pel- 
lets to be entirely inseneitive to energy levels many times in excess of those 
available in the flight environmmt. 
The conclusion reached a s  a result of the tests is that the X-258 pyrogen 
igniter could not have beer. ignited by any other means than by squib initiation. 
2. Premature Motor Ignition by Ziectrical S y ~ t e m  Malfunction 
The electrical power system for the second stage of the Delta vehicle cofi- 
sists  of the primary direct current sources and the di~tribution etwork required 
to provide power to the various second stage vehicle components and equipments. 
A block diagram of the power system i s  shown in Appendix C. The main com- 
ponents of this system are:  
Battery, instrumentation, HR-5, 28 volts nominal, five ampere-hour. 
Battery, engine, HR-15, 28 volts nominal, 15 ampere- hour. 
Eattery, control, HR-5, 28 volts nominal, five ampere-hour. 
Inverter, static, 15/26 volt, three-phase, 400 cps 1 percent 0.075 kva; 
2 windings 135 volt, single phase, 8.5 volt-ampere (va) outputr &)I- 
zhronized to * 0.01 percent frequency regulation by programmer timer. 
Junction boxes, including relays, interconnecting cabling, and circuitry. 
Wiring harnesses. 
Umbilical disconnects. 
The batteries provide 2b volt dc p w e r  to the guidance system, flight coc- 
troller, engine sequence box, hydraulic pump, telemetry system, pyrotechnic 
circuits, ordnance systems, and the inverter. The dc wiring is two-wire, 
grounded negative. The inverter provides both 3 phase and single phase ac power 
to the flight controller. The ac wiring is four-wire wye-connected wit:: neutral 
grounded for the three phase inberter output and two-wire for the single p h ~ s e  
outputs. Dur inz ground operations and checkout, power is provided by means of 
urnbiiical connections located on the second stage equipment section airframe. 
The junction bolrss contain relays, terminal blocks, d i d e ~ ,  and resistors as re-  
quired for the various electrical functions of the second stage. A four receptacle 
quick-disconnect umbilical assembly is  located on the lower rlgl~t-hand side of 
the ~quipment section for connecthn to external power supplies. The assembly 
enades switching to the internal battery power prior to vehicle lift off without 
interruption of power in excess of 10 milliseconds. Electrical wiring is routed 
from the umbilical assembly to  the power distribution box, the sequence distri- 
bujion box, flight controller, telemetry system, range safety junction box, and 
guidance system. Interconnecting cables to the engine section of the vehicle, 
which is ser  irated from the equipment section by the propellant tanks, a r e  routed 
through external tunnels mounted on the airframe. Interstage wiring to the first  
stage is  routed through the second stage engine section with a quick disconnect 
at the separation plane. lnterstage wiring to the third stage is through a conduit 
(spin tube) to the spin table terminal board and from the terminal board through 
two-wire cutters (interface! to the third stage attach fitting terminals. 
The third stage electrical system, which is located on the payload attach 
fitting, consists of the following: 
a. A sirigle third stage battery made up of six (6) HR-05 Yardney Silvercel 
battery cells comected in series. The battery has a nine volt nominal, 
0.5 amp-hour at 2, 0.5 ampere discharge rate capahility, but is used in 
this application to pravide high currents for short time periods. 
b. Tming, sequencing, and firing circuits required to accomplish paddle 
deployment, boom deployment, spacecraft separation, and yo weight 
release o r  tumble rocket ignition when necessary. 
Tk .\ second to third stage interstage structure includes the electrical cir- 
cuitry associated with the spin rockets, squib delay switches, separation bolts, 
third stage squib initiators, and wire cutters. The squib delay switches control 
power to the wire cutters. The cutters sever the wires crossing the second to 
third stage interface. The separation bolts fire to release the third stage prior 
to third stage burn. 
The performance of the electrical system on Delta 33 was monitored by on- 
board instrumentation and appeared to be normal through sequence 4 of the 
second stage programmer. However, portions of the data were commutated 
necessitating further analysis and testing of the electrical system to insure a 
higher probability of proper system performance. 
Since the mission failure was associated with the premature ignition of the 
third stage motor, only those portions of the electrical system which could have 
contributed to the failure a re  considered here. 
There a re  two basic failure modes by which the electrical system might 
cause premature ignitim of the third stage motor. They a r e  an early pulse with 
sufficient energy to initfate normal squib operation, o r  excessive current causing 
bnormal squib delay. The third stage firing circuit was analyzed to determine 
the leqgth of t i x e  a pulse could be applied to the circuit and be undetected by the 
instrumentation system. The result6 of this study show that the maximum unde- 
tected pulse length was 17 milliseconds (See Appendix C). This data was then 
used in the pulse sensitivity tests perforrned by the Franklin Institute on the third 
stage ignition squib (SDGOAO), the IMT117 Dirn?le Motor and Atlas OM379-C14 
squib switch which are  on the same circuit. The details aid the results of these 
tests a re  ,l.lt!ined in Reference A. The test data indicates that third stage igni- 
tion squib is ;!. x d e r  of magnitude - less sc!nsitive than the Dimpla Motor o r  the 
Squib Switch. 
Resistance values of the electrical circuit for the third stage ignition squibs, 
the dimple motors, and the squib switches, were determined by actual measure- 
ment. These measurements were made on another vehicle at the Eastern Test 
Range and the results were used to determine initial current distribution for this 
circuit. These calculations indicated under normal operating conditions no ex- 
cessive current would be applied to devices in the circuit. The details of this 
work a r e  presented in Appendix C. 
In addition to the resistance measurements just mentioned, pulse tests were 
performed on a mock-up of the third stage firing circuit. Electrical pulses of a 
few milliseconds duration were applied to the circuit and the output was observed 
across resistors simulating the bridgewires of the electro-explosive devices. 
The purpose of these tests were to determine the effect of circuit resistance on 
the signature of a short duration pulse at the output of the electro-explosive de- 
vices in the circuit. The results of these tests show the r ise  times of the pulses 
at the outputs were less than ten microseconds indicating no appreciable dis- 
tortion. 
The conclusion reached a s  a result of the tests made on the electrical 
system is that any spurious electrical signal that will initiate the third stage 
ignition squib would also initiate the Dimple Motors and the Squib Switches. 
Since the Dimple Motors or the Squib Switches did not initiate prematurely on 
the Delta 33 vehicle, it is highly improbable that a premature electrical signal 
of pulse from the electrical system caused the failure of this mission. 
3. Premature Motor Ignition by Squib Malfunction 
The third stage ignition squibs used in the Delta Vehicle were manufactured 
by the Port Ewen Works of the Hercules Powder Company. To date fifteen lots 
have been manufactured involving a total number of 918 squibs. Of the total 
number of 918 squibs there have been 228 squibs tested and 690 shipped. 
The SDGOAO squib shown in Figure 2 contains a six second time delay train, 
dud  bridgewires with a recommended all fire current of 5.0 amperes per bridge- 
wire. The bridgewires are  covered with a single lead styphnate spot followed by 
a primer charge of 125 mg of lead oxide/boron which initiates the delay train 
composed of tellurium, selenium, and lead. The delay train fires the main charge 
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of 1.5 grams of deflagrating :cad oxide/boron which in turn ignites the BKNO, 
pellets in the igniter. 
The squib body is made up of three concentric brass shells. One end of the 
inside shell is  turned in end a brass button inserted to close the hole. Half of 
the main charge is then inserted and tamped into place and then the second hAf 
is added and the delay train with its lead case is inserted and is used to com- 
press the secmd half of the charge. The primer charge and rubber plug con- 
t?ining the bridgc wire and lead styphnate a re  then added. The tubes a re  then 
crimped, usuall; j d  behind th? rubber plug. Resistance coils and insulation 
are  added and potlir ; compound is poured into the back end. The squib body is 
then placed in the hexder which i s  made of steel and gold plated. Electrical con- 
n~ct ions a rc  providec! through a glass to metal seal in the end of the header. 
Epoxy cement is used on the squib body to retain it in the header. 
The dual bridge resistance is in the order of 1.0 t9 1.8 ohms and will with- 
stand a maximum ~ c )  fire current specification of 1.0 ampere for a duration of 
5 minutes. 
Two-hundred and nineteen live and thirty-six expended SDGOAO squibs were 
submitted for radiographic examination. The squibs were from four different 
production lots identified a: 4-1, 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3. The squibs used in the 
Delta 33 vehicle were from lot 4-1. Each radiograph was examined in detail for 
discrepancies. Several squibs, both live and expended, were dissected to verify 
discrepancies detected by radiograph and to inspect those areas which were not 
clearly illustrated on the radiographic pictures. The following list of discrep- 
ancies or  irregularities were detected a s  L 2esult ~f the above mentioned exami- 
nation: 
Air bubbles iu the potting compound behind the bridgewire block. 
Short insertion depth of the bronze shell into the steel header. 
Incomplete bonding between the outer bronze shell and the steel 
header. 
Large variations in the size and shape of the lead styphnate primer 
spot over the bridgewires. 
Variations ill the amount of ignition charge. 
Air gap between the ignition charge and the delay train. 
Air gap between the delay train and the main charge. 
Deposits of lead/boron main charge material between the outside 
surface of the lead time delay sleeve and the inside surface of the 
innermost brass shell. 
Bent connector pins and sleeves. 
Small ribbons of gold plating shorting across the glass seal of the 
pin connector (this wae the result of burrs on the pin sleeve.) 
Large variations in the location and depth of the crimp around the 
three brass shells. 
Large variations from lot to lot in the length of the three brass 
shells of the squib body. 
Air space between the three outer brass shells @resent on lot 4-1 
only). 
This list of discrepancies are indicative of inadequate Quality Control and 
unaccountable manufacturing practices. 
Radiographic pictures of the two squibs used in the Delta 33 vehicle show 
them to have the following list of discrepancies. 
(1) Short insertion depth of the bronze shell into the steel header. 
(2) Excessive amount of ignition charge. 
(3) Air gap between time delay train and main charge. 
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory and Franklin Institute were the principle 
investigators on the ordnance devices. The Port Ewen Facility of the Hercules 
Powder Company provided the test and shipping history of the several manufac- 
tured lots of SDGOAO squibs. Also, they manufactured several sets of SDGOAO 
squibs having intentional defects for testing purposes. 
At Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory squibs werr: inspected visually both ex- 
ternally and internally. Then several sections of the squib interior were photo- 
graphed at 1,000 - 5,000 frames per second during firing. Externally, the most 
apparent unusual feature was a dark deposit on the outside of the outermost 
sleeve (Figure 3) that appeared to result from a gas leak between the sleeve and 
the gold plated header. An analysis showed that the deposit did not contain lead 
or boron (initiator charge) but was carbonaceous in nature. The probable source 
of the material was revealed when the squib was partially dissected to expose 
the resistors in the bridge leads and the teflon sleeves around the leads. On 
film, the resistors glowed red in a few milliseconds after the application of 
7.5 amps initiating current in one case and in another, 10 amps caused the dark 

p?tting compound around the hot wires to boil and break away pieces. Presum- 
ably when some squibs a re  fired hot liquid or gas can be formed and escape be- 
tween the sleeve and the header. If the sleeve to  header bond i s  weak, a build up 
of gas pressure could conceivably eject the sleeve. In some tests this malfunc- 
tion has happened. During a pyrogen static fire test, the squib initiation current 
remained on and the sleeve was ejected about 8 seconds after the bridgewire 
fired. Within this time span the other functions were normal. In other cases 
there is evidence of partial sleeve ejection (Figure 4) from the header. 
In another squib firing test all of the P ~ O / B  main charge following the lead 
ferrule was removed and the sleeves machined back flush with the terminal face 
of the lead ferrule and delay mix. The squib was fired and the exposed end 
photographed at  5,000 frames per second (see Figures 5 and 6). Nearly sirnul- 
taneously with ignition of the P ~ O / B  charge something that appears to be rapidly 
moving gas emerges from between the lead ferrule and the inner bronze slecve, 
then a short pause, and the entire lead ferrule containing the delay train mows  
out of the tube, perhaps 1/32 of an inch. This entire action takes place in less 
thail a millisecond. 
The sequence of internal squib firing events was examined dynamically by 
slicing it in hali on a plane containing the longitudinal axis. One half was 
mounted tightly in an alutninurn block. The sliced flat side of the squib was 
sealed by a heavy glass plate screwed to the block. Aga.in the firing sequence 
was photographed at fast frame rates. Three significant events appear: (1) When 
the PbO/B initiator charge fires, a ccnsiderable amount of reaction can be seen 
taking place outside of the proper chamber between the lead ferrule and the 
bronze inner sleeve almost all of the way to the terminal end of the ferrule, 
(2) Rather than a smooth ignition of the delay train a rather violent reaction is 
observed to penetrate approximately 1/6 of the total train length (the delay train 
reaction itself is nonlurninous and therefore not observable). (3) A similar 
event occurs when the delay train ignites the final PbO/B charge. It is felt that 
these reactions may be due to an interdiffusion of the PbO/B a t  each end with 
the Selenium/Tclluriurn mix of the delay. 
Some of the more significant results of the Cornell detailed examinatio~l of 
the SD6OAO squibs may be summarized as follows: 
a. Decomposition of the potting compound in the header due to heating by 
the resistance coils causes gas generation and internal pressure build- 
up. Pressure is relieved by ''gas leakagef1 between the shell and header 
or barrel extension o r  in some cases barrel ejection. 


b. Deposition of initiating and/or main charge (lead oxide/boron) material 
in some in~tances  waa observed between the lead ferrule containir. the 
delay train and the bras8 shell (see Figure 7). Patches and globules 
have been observed extending from the main charge end up the length 
of the delay train axid concentrated more heavily at both endw. Tests 
by Cornell indicate a gap greater than .OOC inches is required for 
burning of this material. Gap widths greater than .005 inches are pos- 
sible between the lead ferrule and the tubing due to fit tolerances, lead 
oxide/boron deposition and expansion due to temperature and pressure. 
c. Phenolic insulator displacemznt was noted during ignition charge burning. 
Pressure build-up due to  ignition charge ciu: force the phenolic insulator 
backward toward the header thereby permitting venting of delay train. 
Venting the delay train increases the time delay between initiation and 
output. 
The most significant results from the tests conducted by the Franklin Insti- 
tute are: 
a. Sqliibs inmufactured with excessive ignition charge may exhibit exces- 
sive delay times of about ten (10) seconds o r  extremely short time delay. 
The most probable cause for this abnormal behavior is vetting of the 
time delay train past the bridgewire block and potting compound causing 
a slower burning rate of the time delay mix resulting in excessive time 
delay o r  leaking hot gasses past the time delay ferrule to the main 
charge causing instantaneous firing of the squib. 
b. Squibs manufactured without delay trains, eccentric time delay ferrules, 
and srnall holes through the delay train fired instantly (in the order of 
milliseconds). 
As a result of the above-mec~tioned tests on the SD6OAO squib, it is con- 
cluded that there a r e  several observed discrepancies in the manufacture and 
assembly of the squib that could result in premature ignition of the X-258 motor. 
The most significant discrepancies being (a) excessive ignition charge, and 
(b) deposits of lead/boron main charge material between the outside surface of 
the time dehy  lead ferrule and the inside surface of the innermost brass  shell. 
C ONC LUSIONS 
The most ?robable cause of the premature ignition of the X-258 rocket motor 
and the mission failure was thc malfunction of the SD6OAO squib. The most prob- 
able failure mode of the squib i s  for the initiation charge to bypass the delay 
train through a gap between the lead ferrule and the innermost brass shell. 

SUMMARY 
APPENDIX A 
X-258 (S/N RH-78) MOTOR FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
DELTA 33 OSO-C 
The third stage of the Delta 33 launch vehicle was instrumented to measure 
high range longitudinal acceleration, low range longitudinal acceleration, radial 
acceleration, chamber pressure, motor case temperature, nozzle deflection, and 
detection of aluminum propellant slag build up inside the motor chamber. 
The Delta Project incorporated on the third ttoge of the Deltc, 33 vehicle 
an instrumentation package (Figures A-1, A-2, and A-S', to inyrestigate the cause 
for coning of the third stage/spacecraft assembly incurred immediately subse- 
quent to X-258 motor burnout. This coning results in an e r r o r  in spacecraft 
injection attitude and, consequently in the case of future missions which a r e  
particularly sensitive to dispersions in attitude, can materially degrade the 
overall probability of mission success. 
The three possible causes of thirs anomaly are:  
(1) Nozzle Deflection - Motor case hydrotests have shown that the bond 
between the nozzle attach ring and the fiberglaw aft dome frequently fails and 
under the influence of chamber pfessure the nozzle will move with respect to the 
motor case. These same tests have shown that when chamber pressure falls-off 
the nozzle returns to nearly its original pogition. It is postulated that this lat- 
eral  movement of the nozzle during motor shutdown could produce a lateral im- 
pulse on the motor/spacecrah combination. 
(2) Case Temperature - High case temperature in the rvim of the aft 
dome may soften the fiberglassmotor case and cause misalignment of the thrust 
axis. 
(3) Aluminum Slag Movement - Aluminum propellant slag, trapped 
during thrusting in the sump formed by t k  nozzle throat and the aft dome could 
be spun out to the case sides by centrifugal force when the motor stope thrusting. 
A nonsymmetrical distribution would cause dynamic unbalance with suSseyuence 
coning. 
4 
The performance telrnietry package carried on-board this mission was de- I 
signed to provide the following information: 
f 
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Measurement of X-258 motor case temperature at  26 reprzsentative 
locations. 
Measurement of X-258 nozzle displacement with respect t c  the motor 
case, in pitch, yaw, and longitudinal displacement. 
Measurement of slag movements from the X-258 aft dome to the 
lower case area. 
Measurements of static and low frequency vehicle accelerations in the 
longitudinal and radial directions. 
Measurement of third stage chamber press. -e. 
Measurement of the amplitudes, frequencies, and spectral distribution 
of mechanical vibration of the third stage motor shoulder, resulting 
from aerodynamic buffeting and motor thrusting. 
TRANSDUCERS 
1. Vibration Accelerqmeter, sL 
The vibration accelercnater Is z ;:a! barium titanate unit mounted to the 
forward motor shedder and oriented to measure longitgdinal accelerations. Full 
scale range is adjusted to rt 10 g. 
2. Temperature Gaqes, Tj 
The temperature gages a r e  fine plati~lurn wire, resistance thermometers, 
bounded to a backing strip. Re~is tance of the gage increases with temperature. 
Full scale range is 75°F to 800°F. 
3. Nozzle Deflection Gages, Di 
Deflection gages a r e  linear displacement, wire wound potelltiumeters. Full 
scale range is 7/16 inch. 
4. Slag Sensors, S; 
The slag sensor circuits a re  experimental devices desisaed for t l l s  applica- 
tion to attempt to detect the presence of molten aluminum. They operate or! *he 
principle that any metallic material present within the magnetic iiald of their 
sensors will upset !he null balance condition of oppositely piased pickup coils. 
Since the sensors a re  essentially ferrite antennas, the system is quite 
susceptible to R F  pickup. Mu-metal shields a re  employed to minimize this 
effect. 
5. Vehicle Accelerometers, %H, A,, and ALL 
Vehicle accelerometers a re  servo feed-back units, having a frequence re- 
sponse from static (0 cps) to several hundred cycles per second. 
Two longitudinal accelerometers a re  provided: ALH , a high range, +17 to 
-3g unit, mounted inside the attach fitting, for measuring overall veLicle thrust 
levels; and ALL, a low range ;t lg unit, mounted to the amplifier chassis, for pro- 
viding expanded range detail during period of burnout to determine coning infor- 
mation. A radial accelerometer, A, having a +8 to -4g range, provides spin data. 
6. X-258 Chamber Pressure, PC 
A resistance potentiometer type pressure gage, maunted to the X-258 nose 
ring, and plumbed to the pyrogen unit to measure X-258 chamber burning pres- 
sure. Full scale range is 0 to 500 psia. 
Table A-1 outlines telemetry channel allocations for the transducers de- 
scribed above, 
DATA DISC USSION 
Instrumentation damage resulting from the premature ignition of the X-258 
motor and the abnormal separation of the third stage from the second stage pre- 
cluded any data from slag sensors, nozzle displacement instrumentation, o r  
temperature gauges located at the aft end of the X-258 motor. 
CHAMBER PRESSURE DATA 
Expanded  record^ of the chamber pressure shown iil Figure A-4 were inte- 
grated by means of a planimeter over the time interval from ignition to apparent 
zero pressure. The pressure-time integral obtained by this method is 9,561 
PSIA-Sec. Multiplying by m average CF AT of 14.5 yields a total impulse of 
138,645. This is slightly less than the expected for this motor however the dis- 
crepancy can most probably be attributed to overall accuracy of the T/M system 
and tlie method of data reduction. The chamber pressure trace indicates that the 
motor burned to completion with no unusual events occurring after separation. 
Table A- 1 
OSO-C THIRD STAGE PERFORMANCE 
TELEMETER CHANNEL ALLOCATIONS 
Function 
Vibration 
Fwd. Motor 
Shoulder 
Temperature 
X-258 (26 
Comm.)* 
Displacement 
Nozzle (12 
Comm.)* 
Residual 
Slag X-258 
(8 Comm.)++ 
Acceleration 
Veh. 
(Attach Fit- 
ting) 
Acceleration 
Veh. (Ampl. 
Chas.) 
Acceleration 
Veh. (Ampl. 
Chas.) 
Chamber 
Pressure 
X-258 
rlen- 0 ' 
tation 
- 
Long. 
Aft Dome 
& Slide 
Long. Pitch 
& Yaw 
Aft  Dome 
& Sides 
Long 
Rad. 
Long. 
--- 
Trans- 
ducer 
Endevc 
2221 1 
Trans- 
sonics 
T4596 
Bourns 
14 1 
Proxy- 
Probe 
Budd 
Kistler 
303A 
Kistler 
303A 
Kistler 
303A 
Bourns 
725 1 7 
FS 
Range 
k209 
75 - 
8O(P F 
*1/8 in  
yes/no 
+17/ 
- 39 
+4/ 
-39 
* l g  
0.500 
psi 
-- 
lRlG 
Band 
14 cx 
E 
C 
A 
12 
11 
10 
9 

LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION 
Expanded records of the high range longitudinal acceleration shown in 
Figure A-4 were integrated by means of a planimeter over the time interval from 
ignition to apparent zero acceleration. The acceleration-time integral obtained 
is 3,758 ft/sec. which is 18% less than the predicted of 4559 ft/sec. This appar- 
ent decrease in performance was probably caused from (a) damage to the X-258 
nozzle during separation which would result in a decrease in specific impulse 
realized and (b) the possibility that parts of the spin table remained attached to 
the aft end .-' the motor resulting in an increase in effective payload weight. The 
accelerat; . 4  , - v e  indicates large amplitude coning starting at  separation and 
damping out duri;ig burning of the motor. This coning is probably caused from 
from the abnormal second to third stage separation experienced on this mission. 
CASE TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS 
Temperature data received from the ten sensors located on the side of the 
X-258 motor case indicate a maximum temperature of 475°F a t  500 seconds after 
motor ignition. This is the first  time the case temperature has been measured 
on an X-258-C4 motor and indicates ihe effectiveness of the added chamber insu- . 
lation. The motor case was completely covered -with aluminum foil which makes 
this test the most severe thermal condition the motor will be subjected to in 
flight. Past data indicates that the addition of aluminum foil to the outside of the 
case will i n c r e a ~ e  the maximum case temperature by approximately 100°F. 
Figures A-5 and A-6 a re  temperature-time plots of the case temperature. 
CONCLUSION 
The data received from the pressure gauge and the high range longitudinal 
accelerometer show that the motor performed a s  expected. The decrease in 
performance noted can be attributed to probable damage to the nozzle at  separa- 
tion and additional weight from parts from the spir. table that remained with the 
motor. The temperature data indicates that the possibility of damage to the 
case structu: 11 integrity due to high temperature after motor burnout is small. 
DELTA 33 
( O s o - C )  x -2s  
MOTOR TEMPERATURES 
(CASE SIDE) 
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Figure A-5 
DELTA 33 
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APPENDIX B 
IGNITER HEAD CAP SPIN TESTS 
The X-258 igniter and squib assembly used on Delta 33 was subjected, at 
spin-up, to an angular acce!-eration of 12.5 RAD/SEC and an angular velocity of 
120 R.P.M. The following spin tests were conducted by the Allegany Ballistics 
Laboratory to demonstrate the effect of angular acceleration and spin-up shock 
on the Pyrogen igniter head cap assembly. 
Test No. Anguls r iccaleration 
RB!-~.~P,/s~L " 
-.- 
-. - - 
67 
Angular Velocity 
RPM 
- 
202 
265 
208 
206 
256 
268 
275 
267 
NOTE: (1) Prior  to test number four (4) the head cap assembly was subjected 
to vibration per Mil. Standard-353. 
(2) Tests six (6) throlugh eight (8) were conducted in a darkened room 
with live squibs installed. Moving pictures were taken of each test 
to record any unusual event such a s  static electric discharge that 
may have resulted in ignition of the Pyrogen igniter as a result of 
spin- up. 
RESULTS 
The results of these tests demonstrate that angular accelerations well in 
excess of those experienced in flight have no effect on the Pyrogen Igniter. 
C ONC LUSIONS 
1 f 
I . A s  a result of the above-mentioned tests, it is concluded that the premature 
1 * ignition of the X-258 motor was not the result of spin up acceleration or  shock. 
APPENDIX C 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TESTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The electrical system tests to support the Delta 33 flight failure review 
were performed to provide sequence 4 information for component tests and for  
analysis. This appendix includes the tests and the analysis of the results. 
Sequence 4 Operation 
The normal operation of the sequence 4 circuitry, shown on Figures C-1 
and C-2, is as follows: 
a. The electrical system is switched to the internal batteries prior to 
launch. 
b. A set of parallel-connected inertia switches transfers second stage 
engine battery power to an arm bus when the vehicle reaches a pre- 
determined acceleration level. Power from this a rm bus is transmiti'ied 
to the sequence relays located in the second stage sequence distribution 
box and to the staging relay located in the first  stage (through the first 
to second stage interface). 
c. The staging relay is activated at MECO and causes power to be trans- 
mitted back to the second stage programmer start  relay. The relay 
starts the programmer and is "locked in" through its own contacts. 
d. The programmer then provides the commands at  pre-set times for the 
second stage sequences. 
e. The second stage programmer, which was started at first stage main 
engine cutoff (MEC 0) ,applies the negative (ground) side of the Control 
Battery to the coil of relay K703 at the programmed time for the se- 
quence 4 event (based on mission requirements). Control Battery posi- 
tive is available from lift-off. 
f .  Relay K703 is "locked in1! through one set of its contacts and applies 
Engine Battery voltage through two (2) sets  of its contacts to  parallel 
circuits composed of the redundant bridge wires and squib switches of 
sequence 4 ordnance/pyratechnic items. Each contact provides for all 
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DSV- 3C- 5 (201 12) 
PaY LOAD ATTACH FITTING 
SEQUENCE 4 SCHEMATIC 
FIGURE C-2 
PAGE C-3 
required sequence 4 events. Contact B has an extra function, sequence 
5 back-up. Another set of contacts applies Instrumentation Battery 
voltage to the Instrumentation System to provide an indication of relay 
operation. 
g, The bridgewires "initiate" the following events: 
TESTS 
1. The two third stage timers, 
2. The pyrotechnic delay which ignites the third stage motor after a 
nominal 6 second delay, 
3. Two squib switches which operate after a nominal 1 second delay 
to cyerate two-wire cutters. (This is referred to a s  sequence 4%). 
4. Spin-up (eight spin rockets), 
5. The sequence 5 back-up 4 second delay squib switch. (Two (2) 
seconds after sequence 4 the next programmer event, sequence 5, 
initiates third stage separation and second stage retro.) 
Resistance Verification 
Measurements for the sequence 4 circuit (where actual values were not 
available from Delta 33) were made on another vehicle at  ETR. A constant cur- 
rent of three (3) amperes was passed through the circuit under test and the 
voltage drops meas i~eed  The resistance values calculated from these measure- 
ments a re  shown in Figure C-?. Mezsured values from the Delta 33 vehicle log 
are  also shown in this fiqure :jnd a re  listed in Table C-1. 
Pulse Tests 
Purpose: Tests were conducted t o  determine if a short duration pulse 
applied at  the second stage Sequence J-Box worllr! appear at all sequence 4 ord- 
nance devices. 
Mock-up Description: The moc!c-up consisted of Sections A and B. 
1 Section A was a DSV-3C second stage equipment canapartment section a s  shown 
in Figure C-4. Sequence 4 circuitry including programmer, sequence J-box, 
engine battery, spin tube and wiring was installed. Section B, shown in Figure C-5, 
consisted of a flight qualified interstage, an X-258 dummy motor case, a flight 
kualified attach fitting, and third stage instrumentation Sequence 4 circuitry was 
complete except for ordnance items and most R. F. filters. These were simulated 
C-5 

TABLE C-l 
- - - -  
DELTA 33 RESISTANCE VALUES FROM LOG SHEETS 
QUANTITY MEASURED 
ATTACH FITTING 
CONNECTIONS, X - 258 
ATTACH FITTING 
CONNECTIONS WITH 
J1214 SHORTED 
IGNITER BRIDGEWIRE 
P474 D TB430 U5 
P471 A AND B 
P471 C AND D 
SERIAL NO. 99 
PIN AAND B 
SERIAL NO. 99 
A N  C AND D 
SERIAL NO. 100 
PIN AAND B 
SERIAL NO. 100 
PIN C AND D 
BETWEE& 
- 
P475 A TB430 W 
P475 B T W O  U4 
P475 C TB430 L7 
P475 D TB430 L5 
P474 A TB430 L6 
P474 B T W O  L4 
P474 C TB430 U7 
SPIN ROCKET RESISTANCE 
IbJ OHMS 
RESISTANCE (OHMS) 
0.68 
0.68 
0.73 
0.73 
0.76 
0.76 
0.74 
I 
A-F A-CASE 
.01 .68 
.02 .05 
.02 .09 
.02 .04 
.02 .04 
(2.42 - 3.72) (NOMINAL) 


An oscilloscope and camera were used to obtain photographs of the 
input pulses and pulses across the load resistor at the spin tube. The pulses at 
input and load points of both halves of the sequence four circuit were identical. 
Only one set, therefcre, was recorded. Photographs were taken at  input and load 
points at a fast sweep rate of the oscilloscope. There photographs enlarge the 
pulse leading edges for close comparison. 
Table C-2 contains Test A photograph data, Column 1 lists the 
photographs which follow the table; column 2 indicates input or  octput; column 3 
S ~ O U S  where the pulse was rccorded; column 4 lists the photograph time scales 
and column 5 lists the voltage scales. 
Test B: 3rd Stage 
The 3 millisecond pulse was applied separately to each half of the 
sequence four circuit at  the spin tube connector. An oscilloscope and camera 
were again used to obtain photographs of the applied pulse and of the pulses ap- 
pearing across the resistors simulating the ordnance devices. The effect of an 
R F  filter in the circuit was also recorded. 
The power supply-pulser combination could not deliver a 2 8  volt 
pulse to the very low resistance of the third stage ordnance circuit. Therefo;.e, 
the pulses applied during Test B were of lower amp':tude than the pulses of 
Test A. These pulses were approximately 17 volts arnplitudc. 
Table C-3 contains Test B photograph data. Column 1 lists the 
photographs which follow the table; column 2 lists the test points; columns 3 and 
4 show the conneckjrs and pins across which the oscilloscope was connected; 
column 5 list& the resistancr. values used for simulation, and column 6 l ists  the 
scales for the photographs. . 
Test Results 
From the photographs of input and output pulse waveforms, it is evident that 
no appreciable distortion occurs. Also, the niagnitudes of the outputs at  each 
ordrlance location agree with the expected voltege ratios a s  shown on Table C-4. 
Relay T e ~ t  
A sample of the sequence 4 relay, K703, was tested by the GSFC Quality 
Assurance Branch to see  if contact chatter o r  c ioswe could be induced by vibra- 
tion or  shock at  Deita powered flight levels. It should be noted that the Delta 33 
was in an extended coast period prior to  the failure. The relay experienced no 

problems during this test with the monitoring equipmelit set to detect a chatter 
level of 100 microseconds. 
ANALYSIS 
Summary 
The sequence 4 circuit and engine battery monitor paints were analyzed to 
determine the time a pulse could be applied to the circuit and bt undetected by 
the hstrumentation sy, tem. This was determined to be 17 milliseccnds. 
TABLE C-3 
i I 
OSO - C PULSE TEST B PHOTOGRAPH DATA 
PHOTO I F -(2 TEST POINT CONNECTOR (5 RESISTOR (6 SCALE IN PUT SPIN ROCKET I 1  SPIN ROCKET I 2  SPIN ROCKET 13 
SPIN ROCKET 44 
SPIN ROCKET I 5  
SPIN ROCKET 16 
SPIN ROCKET 17 
SPIN ROCKET I 8  
SWITCH 51200 
DIMPLE MOTOR T424 
DIMPU MOTOR 742 
IGNITOR 531118 
IGNITOR SQUIB 
INPUT 
INPUT 
SPIN ROCKtT I 1  
SPIN ROCKET 12 
SPIN ROCKET 13 
SPIN ROCKET f 4 
SPIN ROCKET I 5  
SPIN ROCKET 13 
SPIN ROCKET 17 
SPIN ROCKET I 8  
DiMPLE MOTOR T424 
DIMPLE MOTOR T425 
IGNITOR SQUIB 
IGNITOR SQUIB 
SWITCH 51201 
INPUT 
2- 1 
C-B 
C - B  
C - 0 
C-B 
r - e  
C-B 
C-B 
C-B 
W-C 
1-2 
i -2 
A- B 
C-D 
2- 1 
10-8 
E -  D 
E -  D 
E-  D 
E -  D 
E -  D 
E- D 
E-D 
E- D 
3 - 4 
'4-4 
C - D  
A- B 
v -z  
10-8 
A-B 
2- 1 
iGNlTOR SQUIB I 
INPUT I 
TIME SCALE 0.5 MS/CM 
( w / f )  - with filter 
(WO/F) - WTHOUT FILTER 




TABLE C - 4  
PULSE AMPLITUDE RATIOS 
I DEVICE I VOLTAGE OUT AT ORDNANCE/FI LTER VOLTAGE I N  AT J1215 I 
t I COMPUTED ' I MEASURED  
I SPIN ROCKET 
SQUIB SW!TCH 
DIMPLE MOTOR 
FOR BOTH SEQUENCE 4 CIRCUITS 
I-- I 0.20 
IGNITOR SQUIB 
* ( 1 )  WIRING RESISTANCE NEGLECTED 
(2) SUBSTITUEb RESISTANCE VALUES APPROXIMATE 
0.17 
0.18 
0.29 
A second facet of the electrical system study was the determination of 
initial current distributions for different circuit conditions. Table C-5 provides 
a summary of this work. 
0.16 
0.24 
0.46 
Engine Battery Voltage Transients at Sequence 4 
0.41 I 
Following the flight failure of Delta 33, an intensive review of the 2nd stage 
TM data was begun. Since several ordnance devices a re  fired from the Engine 
Eiattery at  the point in time known a s  Sequence 4, a close look at  the engine bat- 
tery voltage at this time was begun. The results a re  documented below. 
Figure C-6 is a reproduction of the actual telemetry records from Delta 33 
showing both the engine battery voltage and the event marker which indicates the 
occurrence of Sequence 4 o r  spinup of the third stage. The voltage shows an 
initial drop, recovery, a decreasing value, then an increasing value terminated 
by loss of TM signal. 
To review, there a re  5 classes of ordnance devices of the heated bridgewire 
type initiated at Sequence 4. These are listed in Table C-5. There a re  1 7  de- 
vices having a total of 27 bridgewires which are connected across the e n g i ~ e  
battery at  Sequence 4. These devices a re  primarily high current devices so that 
a heavy current drain from the battery would be expected and thus the initial 
very sharp drop of the battery voltage. Various bridgewires within the squibs 
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DELTA 33 
Figure C-6. Engine Battery Voltage at Sequence 4, Delta 33 
may short to case,  to each other; they may burn open o r  carbonize into a high 
resistance path to qround. This action is comparatively random and thus the 
varying load on the battery following the initial firing pulse. At 0.7 second after 
Sequence -1, all 2nd stage T M  data was lost. Normally, however, the one (1) 
second time delay explosive switches would remove the power from the ordnance 
device and operate the wire cutters and it would be natural to expect a stepwise 
recovery of the battery voltage. 
To determine if the battery voltage signature or: Delta 33 w:ts typical, records 
from past successful Delta launches were examinoci. Thesc records have been 
reproduced as  Figures (2-7, 8 ,  and 9. It should be noted here that the burn time 
of the spin rockets and the type of third stage t imer dimple motors varied from 
flight to flight. There a r e  2 classes of,battery signatures identifiable. 
DELTA 26 
SEQUENCE 4 
Figure C-7. Engine Battery Voltage at Sequence 4, Delta 25, 26, and 
SEC 
27 
. . . . . . . . .  -.--.-.---A. ... 
DELTA 32 
...... - . .* .- 
I 4 0.2 SEC 
i 
DELTA 31 
I 
DELTA 30 -1 0.2 SEC 
1 
DELTA 28 INITIATE - 
SEQUENCE 4 
Figure C-8. Engine Battery Voltage at Sequence 4, Delta 28, 30, 31, and 32 
INITIATE 4 
SEQUENCE 4 
k- 1 SEC -4 
DELTA 29 
Figure C.9. Engine 9attery Voltage at Sequence 4, Delta 29 
Referring to Figure C - 7  they a r e  the Delta 25 c lass  and the Delta 2C; class .  
Past flights which fall into thc Delta 25 c lass  a r c  Deltas 29, 30, 31, and 25. The 
wmainder  a r e  classed with Delta 26, except pelts 28 which appears  to  be a 
combination of both 25 and 26. The initial voltage drop, observed in Delta 33 
and thc Delta 26 c l a s s ,  was not observed ic the Delta 25 c lass  probably due to 
the sampling period of the ThI system. The stepwisc increase in voltage a t  
1 second af ter  sequence -I, clear ly apparent in the Delta 25 c lass ,  i s  not s o  
clearly visible in thc Delta 26 class .  The differences may be due only to the 
random load caused by the spent bridgewire. Spccifically, any shorted bridge - 
wires may be "hurned clear"  pr ior  t c  the 1 second t ime s o  that there \vas l e s s  
lox! to he removed by the  explosive switches (S1200/'1201). In the records  ex- 
nnlincd, the battery voltage had returned to normal at the end of thc I second 
period, indicating that all  load was removed by this time. 
On Delta 33, the second s tage telemetry system contained a PDM (pulse 
durnticm modulation) commutator using a standard IRIG 4.5 20 format. The 
commutator consisted of 45 segments salnpled sequentially at  the rate of 20 sam- 
ples per  second. Each chann*:l was therefore sampled at 50 millisecond intervals. 
The duration d the engine battery voltage transient at  Seqcence 4 can be 
estimated with the aid of Figure C-10, which is a representation of the PDM 
SEQ. 4 
PULSE OBS. 
SEQ. 4 
PULSE NOT 
HERE / 
9c 
KEYER 
14 
srQ. 4 
PULSE NOT 
OBSERVED HERE 
1 22 
SEQ* PULSE O K .  
HERE 
A. SEQ. 4 ORDNANCE LOAD 
1. MIMIMUM DURATION OF PULSE-THROUGH 13 CHANNELS @ 1.1 rns= 14ms 
2. MAXIMUM DURATION OF PULSE - (JUST AFTER CH. 14 TO JUST BEFORE CH. 
5=40ms 
B. POSSIBLE SPURIOUS PULSES 
1. MINIMUM DURATION FOR CERTAIN DETECTION - 15 CH. @ 1. I ms= 17ms 
2. MAXIMUM UNDETECTABLE PULSE WIDTH < 15CH. = 16.5rns 
Figure C-10. Schematic Raprasentation of PDM Commutotor 
commutator. Channeis 5, 14, 22, and 35 derive theix input signal from the 
engine battery. The initial pulse was observed on channels 22 and 35, but not on 
14 and 5. Therefore, the duration of the pulse was between 14 and 40 milli- 
seconds. Further, because of the distribution of the channels around the com- 
mutator, a pulse with a duration of 17 milliseconds o r  more would be observable 
by the TM system. 
With the information above, t!,e conditions f o ~  an undetected (TM-wise) pre- 
mature ignition of the X-258 motor can be listed. 
(1) The premature igniting signal must have a duration of less  than 
1 7  n~illiseconds and must occur between the commutation points of 
the PDM system. 
(2) If the premature igniting signal were generated by the 2nd stage 
programmer, i t  must be of insufficient duration t o  operate the Se- 
quence 4 relay K703 (operate time 10-16 milliseconds). 
(3) The premature igniting signal must ignite only the X-258 squibs 
and not the other ordnance devices connected in parallel. 
(4) The premature ignition signal must be given six (6) seconds pr ior  
to the observed Sequence 4, assuming a nominal igniter delay. 
The telemetry data from Delta 33 show the following: 
(1) There were no spurious signals recorded by Channels 5 ,  14, 22, 
and 35 during the 20 seconds prior to Sequence 4. 
(2) The sequence 4 event relay K703 operated a t  the proper programmed 
time. 
(3)  The available TM channels provide positive assurance that the ord- 
nance devices connected across the X-258 squibs were not actuated 
prior to sequence 4. 
(4) There were no spurious pulses on any of the battery channels of 
six (6) seconds prior  to  Sequence 4, which could be reasonabiy 
interpreted as  an X-258 igniter firing pulse. 
From tht foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
a. The engine battery voltage signature at Sequence 4 was not sigmficantly 
different than those on past Delta flights. There is nothing to indicate 
the signature was not normal. 
b. If premature ignition of the X-258 motor occurred, it was accomplished 
without firing the other ordnance devices, which were properly initiated 
at Sequence 4. 
c. There i ?  no evidence to  indicate that a motor ignition signal was present 
prior  to  Sequence 4. 
While this analysis does not pinpoint the c a m e  of the failure on Delta 33, i t  
does tend to eliminate one possible cause, the early (6 second before Sequence 4) 
ignition. 
Current Distribution 
The load on the engine battery a t  sequence 4 was calculated t o  determine the 
total current  available from the battery. The current distribution was determined 
from this quantity. Figures C-11 through C-13 depict the load for three condi- 
tions of the sequence relay K703. Fi r s t  is the normal operation in which all 
bridgewires a r e  comected to thc engine battery through two contacts of the relay. 
Then, operation of each contact of the relay is considered. These might corre-  
spond to a momentary c l o s u ~ e  o r  short circuit. These a r e  summarized in 
Table C-5. 
Three special conditions were considered to determine the power that might 
be dissipated in the SDGOAO squib with various combinations of open and short 
circuits. Figures C-14, C-15 and C-16 show these connections. 
Douglas Aircraft Corp. calculated the initial current distribution when the 
Delta third stage was changed from the X-248 motor to the X-258 motor. These 
calculations were based on the use of a 1.5 ohm resistor  in ser ies  with each 
bridgewire of the SD6OAO squib. Delta 33 had R F  filters instead of these re-  
sistors.  Tnese f i l ters  were added t o  provide additional R F  protection f o r  the 
SDGOAO squibs. The ear l ic r  Douglas calculations (Table C -6) a r e  presented for  
comparison to those obtained with the filters.  
Third Stage Short Circuit 
A third phase in the examination of the electrical system was the distr i lu-  
tion of current if  the third stage battery should short tci the sequence 4 circuit at 
some point on the attach fitting. The results a r e  shown in Figure C-17,  and in- 
dicate this to  be an mlikely failure mode. The third stage schemati2 is provided 
as Figure C-18. 
.a- OZ* 
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ASSUME ALL BRIDGE WIRES EXCEPT ONE S O 6 0  A 0  
OPEN AND LO4DS OTHER T HAN THIS SD6O A0 SQUIB 
ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT. 
25.6 AMPS 
NOTE 
ALL RESISTANCE VALLIES IN CHMS 
Figure C-16. Special Condition (Assume All Bridgewires Except One SD60AO Open and Loads 
Other Than This SD60AO Squib are not Significant) 
TABLE C - 6  
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS 
PYRO- TECHNIC WORST CASE (AMPS) 
NOMINAL 
(AMPS 1 
RE- AtdALYSIS CHARACTER1 STlCS 
WORST CASE 1 NOMINAL 1 M(r::y ( RECOMMENDED 
(AMPS 1 (AMPS) (Ah46 1 
SPIN ROCKETS 1.22 I .o  1.185 0.732 1.12 0.50 1 .O 
OM 397 
SQUIB SWITCH 1.465 N /  A 1.54 0.80 I .O 
A mock-up of the second and third stages a s  well as  wiring diagi-ams and 
schematics were examined for proximity of power sources, terminals o r  any 
deficiency that might provide the means for a short duration pulse to energize 
the SDGOAO squib. None were detected. 
DIMPLE MOTORS 
X258 
IGNITORS 
5.87 VOLT' 
0.391A 
SPIN 
ROCKETS 
8 PLACES 1 
0.735 
4.93 
4.94 
1 TOTAL = = 9 AMPS 
- 
0.306A 
DIMPLE 
MOTOR 
0.91 
6.30 
VOLTAGE 4T BATTERY TERMINALS 
9 4 9 x . 3 1 . 6 . 3  VOLTS AT X 
0.302A 
DIMPLE 
MOTOR 
0.575 
5.0 
-SHORT TO 1 THIRD STAGE 
Figure C-17. Sequence 4 Current Distribution - Third S t q e  Short 
0.835 
5.82 
BATTERY 
0.23 
4.5 
1 .O 
5.0 
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